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Safeguarding the EDTIB: the Case for 
Supervising non-EU FDI in the Defence Sector 
Daniel Fiott 
It is time for the EU member states to start 
collectively  supervising  non-EU  FDI  in 
Europe’s  defence  industries  and 
infrastructures.  This  should  be  a  prudent 
element of the nascent EDTIB and a way to 
maintain European security by encouraging 
greater  coordination  between  the  national 
supervisory frameworks. 
INTRODUCTION  
The  European  Defence  Technological  and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB) is a key factor in the 
European  Union’s  (EU)  ability  to  become  a 
credible  international  military  actor.  The 
underlying logic of the EDTIB is to deal with 
the structural economic shifts in the European 
and  global  defence  industry  by  fostering  the 
development of defence industrial capabilities, 
security of supply between countries, increased 
competition in the defence equipment market, 
deepening  and  diversifying  supplier  base  and 
increased armaments cooperation. However, if 
the EDTIB is a fundamental building block of 
the  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy 
(CSDP),  and,  as  the  High  Representative  has 
stated, it is indispensible from a strategic and 
economic  point  of  view,  a  number  of  recent 
and  longer-term  developments  should  give 
pause for thought. 
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Indeed, the combination of the need to re-
structure Europe’s fragmented defence sector 
and the fiscal consolidation brought about by 
the eurozone crisis is pushing some member 
states to undertake the privatization and sale 
of industrial assets. Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)  –  through s h areholdings,  mergers  and 
acquisitions made in and with third-countries 
– by non-European strategic competitors is a 
particular  challenge  for  the  EDTIB.  Policy-
makers have the unenviable task of balancing 
the  need  to  re-structure  the  EU’s  defence 
industry  whilst  also  maintaining  European 
security.  This  policy  brief  inquires  into  the 
management  of  this  balance,  before  then 
outlining  a  number  of  possible  models  that 
could  be  used  as  an  EU-level  supervisory 
framework to better protect the EDTIB.  
 
PROTECTING YOUR BASE 
The role of military science and technology is 
essential  to  the  survival  of  any  political 
community. Just as the Germanic tribes used 
the  horseshoe  to  overcome  the  bogs  and 
marshes  that  would  see  them  repel  the 
onslaught from Roman legions, so do drones 
make the task of finding suspected terrorists in 
places  such  as  Pakistan  and/or  Afghanistan 
easier  by  circumventing  mountains  and 
inhospitable  terrain.  For  such  technological 
advances to occur there need to be effective 
institutional-industrial  mechanisms  in  place. 
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Combined with the need to rationalise a long 
fragmented defence sector in the EU, the steps 
to nurture the EDTIB as a foundation of the 
CSDP  is  a  response  to  the  need  for  such 
mechanisms.  Indeed,  when  EU  ministers 
agreed to establish an EDTIB in 2007 they did 
so to underpin the CSDP and thus the EU’s 
security  and  strategic  “toolbox”.  The  Base  is 
designed  to  supply  the  EU  with  cutting-edge 
technology and defence equipment, and to do 
so  in  such  a  way  as  to  maintain  the  EU’s 
defence independence and to take advantage of 
possible economic opportunities – for example, 
by  developing  dual-use  technologies  with 
civilian application. As European Commission 
Vice-President  Antonio  Tajani  has  put  it, 
‘defence  markets  are  fundamental  in  giving 
Europe  greater  independence  and  sovereignty 
in defence’ (2011). 
 
The EDTIB is also a response to festering 
structural  imbalances  in  Europe’s  defence 
sector.  The  critical  problem  in  the  EU’s 
defence sector relates to costs and the impact 
of  such  costs  on  economic  growth  potential, 
particularly  since  the  eurozone  crisis. T h e  
globalization of military supply chains and the 
“peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period, 
which has led to less demand from the EU and 
the United States, have indeed resulted in high 
and  volatile  equipment  costs.  As  defence 
markets  and  rationalization  efforts  are  still 
largely  fragmented  in  the  EU  -  with  the 
resulting  market  congestion,  duplication  of 
spending  on  Research  (R&D),  rival  projects 
and short production runs - coping with such 
costs  has  elicited  a  number  of  different 
responses  from  the  member  states.  The  first 
such  response  has  been  to  reduce  defence 
spending. With the exception of some member 
states, the EU average share of GDP spent on 
defence declined from 1.7% in 2001 to 1.4% in 
2010 (Ecorys, 2010). This is thus below the 2% 
minimum required of NATO members.  
 
The  European  Commission  has s o u g h t  t o  
facilitate further cost savings by adopting and 
promoting,  vis-à-vis  the  member  states,  its 
“Defence Package” with two Directives aimed 
at  simplifying  intra-EU  defence  equipment 
transfers and defence procurement procedures. 
The Commission believes a European defence 
industrial  policy  should,  among  other  things, 
promote  competition,  liberalization  and 
innovation.  It  wants  to  de-fragment  defence 
markets  at  the  national  level,  by  integrating 
certain  defence-sectors  within  the  internal 
market, in order to overcome the high degree 
of regulation and duplication in defence-related 
industries  and  to  boost  Europe's  global 
competitiveness.  The  Commission  has  been 
keen to seize on reduced defence budgets and 
high research costs to push for more defence 
industry  integration. H o w e v e r ,  a  second 
response by the member states – in many cases 
encouraged by the Commission – has been to 
privatize  and  sell  defence  industrial 
infrastructure in the highly indebted countries. 
This further adds to the problem of states not 
even owning ‘the industry required to produce’ 
defence  capabilities ( M ölling  &  Brune,  2011: 
10). 
 
Sales of such infrastructure to EU member 
states  cannot  be  objected  to  in  the  internal 
market,  and  to  some  degree  such 
developments  play  into  further  consolidation 
of the EU’s defence market (e.g. the proposed 
BAE/EADS  merger),  even  if  national  legal 
safeguards under Article 296 of the Treaty of 
the  European  Community c a n   still  be  used 
during the acquisition period. Indeed, intra-EU 
acquisitions of defence firms form the bulk of 
infrastructure  sales.  As  one  can  see  from 
Figure 1   below,  from  2007  to  2009 t h e  
majority of reported acquisitions for European 
arms  producing  companies  have  come  from 
the EU. None of the emerging powers such as 
Brazil, Russia, India and China rank among the 
list  of  acquisitions  from  2007-2009. T h e  
United  States  (US),  a  defence  industrial 
competitor, ranks second highest in terms of 
the value of acquisitions at US$ 5,336 million. 
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However,  any  future  sell-offs t o  n o n -
European  states  should  necessitate g r e a t e r  
scrutiny. Indeed, there are a number of planned 
privatizations. For example, by the end of 2012 
Greece’s Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS) defence 
manufacturing  company  and  Portugal’s  Viana 
do Castelo (ENVC) shipyard will be privatized 
and potentially sold to non-European bidders. 
While  ENVC’s  commercial  viability  has  long 
been  questioned,  and  the  yard  has  only 
produced two military frigates in its history, any 
foreign  buyer  can  take  advantage  of  the 
relatively  high-tech  “know-how”  accumulated 
by the yard. Of more concern should be the 
sale of HDS, as the company is not only in the 
business of producing weaponry ranging from 
shotgun cartridges to large calibre Greek patriot 
missiles but it is also a NATO certified Missile 
Assembly  Disassembly  Facility.  Valuable 
classified  information  and  procedures  should 
not be handled so lightly, and neither should 
the risk of supply security. The same is equally 
true of the acquisition of Deltamarin - a Finnish 
naval  shipbuilding  company  –  for  US$  51 
million  in  October  2012  by  China’s  state-
owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC). 
 
The outflows of military know-how through 
non-European inflows of FDI are therefore a 
concern, especially if non-European firms are 
state-owned.  Indeed,  emerging  economies  are 
using  the  eurozone  crisis  to  tap  into  new 
European  markets,  to  expand  production 
chains  and  to  increase  human  capital  and 
technological  know-how.  While  private  firms 
such  as  Huawei  Technologies  and  Lenovo 
Group  are  responsible  for  the  ‘overwhelming 
majority of deals’ in the EU (80% to be exact), 
the value of FDI deals made by State-owned 
Enterprises such as the China Ocean Shipping 
Group  Company  in  the  EU  rank  higher  in 
terms  of  overall  value.  Aside  from  these 
commercial, non-military, investments there are 
still potential security risks. For example, while 
Chinese FDI in the EU obviously pre-dates the 
eurozone  crisis,  it  has  been  estimated  that  in 
2011  China’s  major  FDI  assets  included 
US$253 million in aerospace, defence and space 
and  US$1,357  million  in  communications, 
equipment and services (Hanemann & Rosen, 
2012: 45-46 & 41). 
 
Some readers will perhaps argue that FDI in 
Europe  brings  new  capital,  employment 
opportunities,  boosts  productivity  and  that  it 
serves as a means to bring countries such as 
China in line with EU standards through the 
Single Market. Others might argue that the EU 
does  not  really  have  to  worry  about  FDI 
exposure to emerging economies in the short-
term, given that both overall FDI inflows and 
outflows  have  decreased  since  2007  (inflows 
have  decreased  by  approximately  US$436 
FIGURE 1 - ACQUISITIONS OF EU-BASED ARMS PRODUCING COMPANIES, 2007-2009 
Firm location    Total No.   Total approx. value of deals (US$ millions) 
EU (total)    36    10,647 
United Kingdom  21    6,598 
United States    12    5,336 
France     5    3,809 
Germany    4    128 
Spain      2    50 
Canada     1    33.5 
Italy      1    30 
Sweden          2    25.6 
 
Source: SIPRI, 2012 
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billion;  outflows  have  decreased  by 
approximately  US$555  billion  (OECD,  2012). 
Going further still, and with some justification, 
others could point out that to single-out states 
such as China as a threat to the EU’s defence 
industrial  infrastructure  is  not  quantitatively 
supported given that in 2010 the US was still the 
largest  FDI  investor  in  the  EU  followed,  in 
order of investment value ranking, by Canada, 
Hong  Kong,  Switzerland,  Brazil,  Japan,  China, 
India and Russia.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of coordination 
between the EU member states on the process 
of privatization. Indeed, as yet there is currently 
no European-level framework for the screening 
of FDI. In fact, FDI screening is fragmented at 
the national level which leads to a “race to the 
bottom” as national procedures favour “short-
cuts”  in  order  to  secure  short-term  economic 
gains (IAI et al, 2010: 325). So far only ten EU 
member  states  have  FDI  restrictions  of  some 
kind  in  place  for  the  defence,  transport  and 
telecommunications sectors and Lithuania is the 
only member that has an outright prohibition on 
FDI in defence and security from non-EU and 
non-NATO members. This situation has led to a 
number of calls for a European-level supervisory 
body  –  not  least  from  the  European 
Commission  -  to  look  at  internal  market  and 
trade supervision for areas such as defence and 
critical technologies, among others. The second 
part  of  this  policy  brief t u r n s  t o  w h a t  a  
framework  for  supervision  of  non-European 
FDI could look like. 
 
AN  EU  MODEL  FOR  PROTECTING  THE 
EDTIB 
In  2007  Michael  Brzoska  wrote  an  extremely 
prescient report in which he outlined both the 
risks of not protecting the EDTIB, and some of 
the  rudiments  of  a  potential  supervisory 
framework. As he explains: ‘while an increasing 
number  of  cautious  activities  for  nurturing  a 
European  approach  to  defence  technology-
generation and production capabilities in Europe 
are apparent, there are no similar initiatives for 
protecting  these  capabilities  from  foreign 
control or ownership on the European level’ 
(Brzoska, 2007: 11). As he continues, ‘because 
of  the  double  risk  of  losing  out  on 
competitiveness and of European control, the 
current  focus  on  improving  competitiveness 
should be balanced by the development of a 
policy  and  instruments  for  the  protection  of 
crucial  assets’ ( ibid.).  Yet  a  number  of  EU 
member  states  have  no  formal  policies  that 
protect  their  respective  defence  industries 
from n o n -European  FDI.  The  European 
Commission has recognised the importance of 
an absence of such policies. 
 
An  informal  letter  sent  by  the 
Commissioners  for  Industry  and 
Entrepreneurship,  Antonio  Tajani,  and  the 
Internal Market, Michel Barnier, raised the idea 
of establishing a high-level committee to vet 
FDI bids for European companies. As Tajani 
has stated: ‘we have decided to raise this issue 
because  it  is  very  much  felt.  I  am  highly 
favourable to non-EU investments in Europe, 
but I do not want these to mask attempts to 
close down businesses after having stolen all of 
their  “know-how”’  (European  Commission, 
2011).  The  Commissioners  recognise  that 
states such as Australia, Canada, China, Japan, 
Russia  and  the  US  have  similar  vetting 
procedures in place, and the model tabled by 
the Commissioners would resemble that of the 
US,  ‘which  has  an  organism  that  evaluates 
non-US investments to see if these impinge on 
national  security  or  contradict  American 
norms’ (Ibid.). The Commission has confirmed 
that looking at ways to vet FDI on the basis of 
security  concerns  would  be  well  within  the 
EU’s right. 
 
Protection of any defence technological and 
industrial base, according to Brzoska, can take 
four main forms – i) demand side measures - 
states  can  buy  their  own  defence  equipment 
and restrict non-government procurement; ii) 
market  measures  –  states  can  subsidise 
domestic  firms  and  fund  R&D  programmes;   5 
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iii) supply side measures – the state can serve as 
a  regulator  of  foreign  ownership;  and  iv) 
ownership  measures  – t h e  s t a t e  c a n  b u y -up 
domestic defence firms or maintain ownership 
through  “golden  shares”.  It  is  clear  from  the 
sentiments of the European Commissioners, and 
in line with maintaining open markets in the EU, 
the  most  favourable  would  be  supply  side 
measures  such  as  the  regulation  of  foreign 
ownership. 
 
Such  regulation  would  require  a  body 
responsible for FDI vetting. One such body that 
could  be  used  as  a  template,  the  “organism” 
referred to by the European Commissioners, is 
the US Department of the Treasury’s Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). 
The CFIUS works to vet potential acquisitions 
for: i) “supply security threats” – to safeguard 
against  non-American  buyers  that  could 
eventually restrict defence supplies to the US; ii) 
“technology  transfer  threats”  –  to  protect 
against  non-American  buyers  that  could  use 
acquired  technology  to  harm  US  security 
interests;  and  iii)  “SIS  threats”  –  to  defend 
against a non-American buyer that could use an 
acquired  defence  firm  for  Surveillance, 
Infiltration  and/or  Sabotage  against  the  US 
(Moran, 2009: 4). Protection against such threats 
in the EU could be elaborated on the basis of 
four models:  
•  “The  Prohibition  Model”:  as  occurs  in 
Finland,  Lithuania  and  Slovenia  this  would 
imply an outright prohibition on all non-EU 
and  non-NATO  FDI  in  the  EU’s  defence, 
aerospace and security sectors.  
•  “The Approval Model”: as occurs in Austria, 
Denmark,  Poland,  Spain  and  Sweden  any 
foreign investors (including those in the EU) 
must first receive government and ministerial 
approval for the acquisition deal.   
•  “The  Review  Model”:  as  occurs  in  France, 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom 
acquisitions by foreign firms may be subject 
to  review  by  the  competent  ministries  and 
government ministers.  
•  “The Supervision Model”: as occurs in the 
United  States,  “Proxy  Boards”  comprised 
of  EU  nationals  would  run  and  monitor 
foreign-owned EU firms. 
 
Each  model,  however,  would  have  its 
drawbacks and policy-makers would still need 
to ensure a balance between market openness 
and  protection.  “The  Prohibition  Model” 
would quickly lead to accusations that the EU 
is  being  protectionist,  which  could  escalate 
protection  measures  in  third-countries.  “The 
Approval Model” and “Review Model” would 
be  accused  of  being  too  arbitrary  and 
discourage all FDI investment as well as trade 
retaliation  measures  in  third-countries.  The 
impact  of  “The  Supervision  Model”,  as  has 
been the experience of the US, is that non-EU 
firms may not enter the European market and 
it  may  cause  a  barrier  to  mergers ( E c o r y s ,  
2010:  300).  In  this  regard,  while  ‘Europeans 
need credible policy instruments of their own 
to ensure inward investment does not put their 
security at risk’ the EU will want to ensure any 
model  remains  open,  comprehensive  and 
sustainable  and  not  resort  to  trade  and 
competition  policy  mechanisms ( R öller  & 
Véron, 2008: 6-7). 
 
For R öller, V éron,  Hanemann  and  Rosen 
the best model would be a modified version of 
“The  Review  Model”.  Indeed,  all  of  these 
scholars  state  that  the  establishment  of  a 
common  European  legislative  framework 
would be ideal, but that the model would also 
have to provide EU member states – especially 
those  without  any  procedures  whatsoever  – 
with a blueprint for national review processes. 
As Röller and Véron (2008) state, any EU-level 
legislative framework could be established by 
way  of  a  European  Commission  Directive 
even if it would no doubt require great efforts 
on the part of EU member states to engage 
and  adopt  such  legislation.  The  Commission 
would  be  well  placed  to  push  for  such 
legislation  given  the  EU’s  new  exclusive   6 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
competence in FDI under the Lisbon Treaty, 
even  if  member  states  still  hold  exclusive 
competence over national security. However, a 
modified “Review Model” would be best-suited 
and  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of  the 
EU  could  each  play  a  role  in  the  vetting 
procedure through a dedicated body. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There  is  a  certain  need  for  the  EU  member 
states to put in place a supervisory mechanism 
that  monitors  non-EU  FDI  in  European 
defence markets. Presently, the need to invest 
political  capital  into  such  a  mechanism  will 
appear  unnecessary  given  the  much  larger 
economic  problems  facing  the  eurozone  and 
the  EU.  Others  will  argue  that  the 
establishment of an FDI protective framework 
will  amount  to  EU  intervention  in  the 
economic and defence policies of the individual 
member states. The prospects of intervention 
by  a  supranational  authority o r  t h r o u g h  
intergovernmental  procedures  may  hinder  the 
chances  for  such  a  mechanism  even  further. 
These  are  all  valid,  if  misguided,  points 
especially when one considers that in the vast 
number of member states national supervision 
frameworks are non-existent, or they are weak 
at best. 
 
Given  the  steps  already  taken  by  the 
member states with regard to assigning the EU 
greater competence over general FDI, and the 
efforts  to  boost  intra-EU  liberalisation  of 
defence  markets  through  the  auspices  of  the 
European  Commission, t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  t h e  
member states working to protect the EDTIB 
is  not  impossible.  Fostering  a  more  efficient 
internal defence market, and protecting against 
harmful  non-EU  FDI  into  critical  defence 
infrastructures, go hand-in-hand. Just as mutual 
fiscal  surveillance  is  increasingly  becoming 
important in eurozone governance, so too must 
mutual  strategic  surveillance  come  to  pass 
under  the  CSDP.  Even  if  a  fully-fledged 
supervisory body does not come into fruition, 
putting it on the EU agenda may at least serve 
to improve national procedures. 
 
Therefore, defence and economy ministers 
in the Council should first arrange for informal 
information  exchanges  on  national  FDI 
supervision  practices.  They  could  then 
eventually  move  to  informal  discussions  of 
planned FDI deals in the defence sector and 
study  the  mutual  EU  impact  of  such  deals. 
Finally,  after  some  time  the  ministers  could 
address  the  idea  for  a  suitable  mechanism. 
Outright  prohibition  of  FDI  would  be 
rightfully  discounted,  but  serious  thought 
should be given to approval and supervision 
mechanisms  over  the  longer-term.  The 
“selling-off”  of  critical  defence  infrastructure 
to  non-EU  investors  is  no  longer  a  purely 
national  concern.  As  the  name  suggests,  the 
EDTIB is a mutual strategic concern. 
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